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The Constellation of Social Ontology:	
Walter Benjamin, Eduard Fuchs, and the Body of History	
Kevin S. Amidon and Dan Krier	
	
Walter Benjamin, Critical Theory, and the Problem of Sexuality	
“Fuchs lacks not only a sense of the destructive in caricature but also a sense of the 
destructive in sexuality, especially in orgasm.”  In this sentence, Walter Benjamin 
encapsulated perhaps the most pointed critique of his subject as he drafted the essay 
“Eduard Fuchs: Collector and Historian” (Eiland & Jennings, 2014, p. 549; hereafter: 
Fuchs essay). Nonetheless this striking critical statement did not appear in the published 
essay, for in the process of his final revision of the proofs, Benjamin struck the sentence 
(Benjamin, 1977, p. 1356).  Benjamin’s editorial choice has one clear and well-
documented explanation: he had no desire to offend Fuchs.  They were personally 
acquainted in their mutual Paris exile of the mid-1930s, and they met several times.  
Fuchs even read and commented upon the essay draft, and Benjamin incorporated some 
of his suggestions (Eiland & Jennings, 2014, p. 550).  From the time in late 1933 or early 
1934 that Max Horkheimer, the director of the Institute of Social Research (hereafter: 
Institute) known to scholars as the Frankfurt School, had commissioned Benjamin to 
undertake the Fuchs project for the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung [ZfS], the Institute’s 
journal-in-exile, it took Benjamin over three years of effort to bring the essay to 
publication. During this interregnum, while dwelling upon the dissonant relationships of 
bodies, images and text in Fuchs’ work, Benjamin produced some of his most important 
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writings.  Benjamin’s essay on Fuchs finally appeared, without this provocative and 
highly critical assessment of Fuchs’s understanding of sex and sexuality, in the 1937 
volume of the ZfS (Eiland & Jennings, 2014, p. 546).  	
Benjamin’s elimination of the sentence hints at much deeper critical stakes.  It 
reveals a constitutive tension that runs through multiple strains of his work, a tension that 
generates dialectical energy between themes that appear variably conjunct and disjunct 
across Benjamin’s prolific journalistic and scholarly production.  This tension places the 
Fuchs essay even more centrally within the emergence of Benjamin’s mature theoretical-
methodological constellation than has already been recognized in the voluminous 
literature.  It is the tension between body and image, between the biological-corporeal 
and the textual-representational. The critical significance of Benjamin’s productive 
resolution of dialectical imagery from an extraordinary range of the material of modern 
life has occasioned vast and revealing scholarly commentary (Jennings, 1987).  The 
significance of corporeality in his work, however, has not always been reflected in the 
scholarly literature (Richter, 2002).  Body and image saturate Benjamin’s writings.  
Howard Caygill has recognized these issues most clearly in Benjamin’s work as a whole:	
Benjamin’s resolution of the tension between word and image is often carried 
through in terms of corporeal rhythms…in the Baudelaire essay it is resolved into 
the libidinal rhythms of the orgasm.  However the turn to corporeal rhythms is 
complicated by Benjamin’s speculative account of experience which introduced 
the infinite into experience through the argument that time is not linear but a 
complex formation of past, present, and future.  Accordingly the alignment of 
concept and intuition in experience was also of extreme complexity, with the 
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patternings of word and image shot through with memories and intimations 
(Caygill, 1998, p. 80).	
Nonetheless Caygill does not read the Fuchs essay closely.  Nowhere, however, more 
significantly than in the Fuchs essay is it possible to derive a subtler understanding of the 
relationships between the body, sexuality, imagery, and history in Benjamin’s later work.  
Such a reading can further point onward toward potential forms of critical theory that can 
fruitfully address emergent social forms and practices in the twenty-first century.  The 
body of Benjamin’s theory of history, read through its constellation of texts and images, 
reveals new paths to the understanding of social ontology.	
Most centrally, it is the question of sexuality, and not just of its representation, but 
also of its elision, refiguration, reinscription, and sublation through Benjamin’s critical 
constellations.  The body, together with its socially and materially accreted sexuality, 
stands at the center of the critical resolution of Benjamin’s methodological vision of 
materialist history in the Fuchs essay.  It is at once revealed and hidden, made manifest 
not directly but obliquely through reflection on and refraction through the pursuit of a 
practice of history that is recursively constitutive of and coterminous with social 
ontology.  Sexuality manifests itself within Benjamin’s thought in the Fuchs essay in 
unique ways, ways that reveal further the close links between the essay and the work he 
pursued alongside it in the 1930s, particularly “The Work of Art in the Age of its 
Technological Reproducibility” (hereafter: Artwork essay).  Furthermore, the clear 
emergence of sexuality into view within Benjamin’s critical horizon allows further 
clarification of the links between the Fuchs essay and the work of Benjamin’s 
interlocutors in the early Frankfurt School at the time, especially Max Horkheimer.	
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Benjamin constellates sexuality as the vector of biological reproduction, whereby 
it becomes capable of resolution from and through its commensurate dialectical partner, 
the technological reproduction of the work of art.  This dialectical refraction of the issue 
of reproduction through both body and work becomes the conceptual fulcrum that allows 
Benjamin to structure his fully-fledged theory of materialist history.  The stakes emerge 
at a central point in the Fuchs essay where Benjamin explores the “biological” quality of 
Fuchs’s understanding of artistic creativity.  Benjamin frames this passage, like much of 
the essay, as simultaneous critique of and engagement with its subject, but always in the 
service of a more expansive argument about the method and material of history.  He 
begins with a vividly phrased critique of the reductive (and of course heavily gendered) 
quality of Fuchs’s “biological” elision of creativity and sexuality through excess – but at 
the same time he grants Fuchs a significant level of interpretive innovation:	
Fuchs’s notion of creativity has a strongly biological slant.  Artists from whom 
the author distances himself are portrayed as lacking in virility, while genius 
appears with attributes that occasionally border on the priapic.  The mark of such 
biologistic thinking can be found in Fuchs’s judgments of El Greco, Murillo, and 
Ribera.  “All three became classic representatives of the Baroque spirit because 
each in his way was a ‘thwarted’ eroticist”….  From different sources, this 
concept of genius fed the same widespread conviction that creativity was above 
all a manifestation of superabundant strength.  Similar tendencies later led Fuchs 
to conceptions akin to psychoanalysis.  He was the first to make them fruitful for 
aesthetics (Benjamin, 2002, p. 272; references hereafter by page number only).	
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Benjamin’s concept of the biological is itself somewhat reductive here, for it resolves as 
the relationship between the corporeal and the sexual, admixed clearly with recognition 
of Fuchs’s gendered analytical rhetoric.  It therefore subtly reinforces the stakes 
surrounding the conceptual constellation of reproduction as the sublation of the corporeal 
in the essay.	
The section of the essay from which this quotation is drawn culminates in a 
lengthy discussion of how Fuchs’s terms of analysis reveal his heavy investment in the 
German “Social Democratic doctrines of the period,” particularly the ways in which “the 
Darwinian influence served to maintain the party’s faith and determination in its 
struggle” with Bismarck and the Prussian state apparatus during the 1870s and 1880s (p. 
273).  Benjamin thereby expands his engagement of the biological to include not just the 
corporeal-sexual, but also the heavily contested intellectual politics of Darwinism in 
Germany during the latter half of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth (Gliboff, 
2008).  Attention to this moment of German social democratic history redoubles 
Benjamin’s critical focus on how the biological dialectically interpolates both the 
corporeal and the political: German socialists made the Darwinian “laws” of natural 
selection into a direct correlative of the “laws” of Marxian historical progress and 
revolution in the later nineteenth century (Kelly, 1981, chap. 7). With this argument 
about the politics of biology, Benjamin successfully widens his analytical optic to 
encompass clearly the question of historical materialism as revealed in the history of 
party-political conflict received and refigured by Fuchs.	
The body, in its reproductive capacity, thus serves Benjamin’s critical goal of the 
manifestation of the full historical stakes of the rise of the technological reproducibility 
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of the work of art.  As Benjamin achieved stages of completion in the Fuchs and Artwork 
essays, both of which were written in the midst of his necessarily fragmented and 
methodologically fracturing Arcades Project, the issue of sexuality became submerged 
somewhat back into the vast and diverse body of material out of which Benjamin sought 
to constellate his materialist history.  His deletion of the sentence about the destructive 
power of sexuality in the published version of the Fuchs essay forms the most visible 
evidence of this process.  Benjamin struggled for some three years with the composition 
of the essay, and the trajectory of the emergence and submersion of the material 
manifestation of the body’s reproductive processes thus forms a conceptual-critical 
correlative of the flow Benjamin’s own intellectual development.  The critical exploration 
of the potential for destruction inherent in reproduction, both that of the artwork and that 
of the material body, becomes his manifest interest.  This central theme in Benjamin’s 
work took its final fragmentary form during his fatal 1940 flight from the Nazi 
occupation of France in his “On the Concept of History,” which derived much from the 
Fuchs essay.  Through Benjamin’s method, bodies and artworks are rendered recursively 
fragmentary through the destructive power of reproduction, particularly where that 
reproduction is excessive.  They thereby become, however, in dialectical constellation 
with one another, the incipient material of historical representation itself.  In Benjamin’s 
optics, the traces of the body devolve through representation into works like the 
caricatures that Eduard Fuchs so vigorously reproduced and ramified within the vast 
textual structures of his books.  The materiality of the body, and along with it the sphere 
of sexuality, can therefore appear to vanish within the Fuchs essay, the history of its 
composition, and its accompanying work.  This vanishing is, however, itself an artifact of 
	7	
Benjamin’s critical-historical method.  His dialectical images remain everywhere 
saturated with sublated renderings of the body.	
	
Eduard Fuchs: The Vanishing Mediator of Classical Critical Theory	
Fuchs (1870-1940) led a colorful if often, in the words of his two-time scholarly 
biographer Ulrich Weitz, “shadowy” life as printer, publisher, social democratic (and 
sometime communist) advocate and agitator, administrator, author, and collector.  His 
books and his marriage made him rich.  The two of Fuchs’s several profusely illustrated 
and extensively annotated sets of multi-volume publications that Benjamin analyzed most 
extensively logically contain the most material related to the body and sexuality, and their 
pictorial representation: Illustrierte Sittengeschichte vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart 
[Illustrated History of Manners from the Middle Ages to the Present; 6 vols. Originally 
published 1909-12] and Geschichte der erotischen Kunst [History of Erotic Art; 3 vols. 
Originally published 1908; 1922-23] (Benjamin, 2002, pp. 272, 280, 289).  These 
collections, brought together out of Fuchs’s own vast personal collection of caricatures, 
accrete massive amounts of text to the high quality, lithographically reproduced images 
visible on nearly every page (Bach, 2010).	
Fuchs lived in the late 1920s and early 1930s in a Berlin villa designed for a 
previous owner by the young Mies van der Rohe that he filled with his massive 
collections (Gorsen, 2006, p. 221).  Nonetheless his socialist politics, along with the 
recurring perception among prosecutors that his books were criminally obscene, brought 
him a lifelong series of criminal and civil charges, trials, imprisonments, controversies, 
and clashes with various authorities.  Fuchs had been among the prominent Social 
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Democrats who split with the party over its support for the First World War to found the 
Spartacist League/Independent Social Democratic Party.  That party went on to fracture 
further into the Communist Party of Germany (KPD).  Fuchs participated in both of these 
party-political innovations, though he subsequently broke with the KPD in 1928 (Weitz, 
2014).  While Benjamin never implies that Fuchs came to take a certain personal pleasure 
in his adversarial position to the German state, Peter Gorsen calls the lengthy set of 
conflicts over obscenity in which Fuchs and his publisher, Albert Langen, battled the 
imperial authorities before the First World War “crafty [listig]” (Gorsen, 2006, p. 219).  
In 1933 Fuchs fled the Nazis for exile in Paris, where he and Benjamin became 
personally acquainted.  Despite much effort his collections were never restituted to him, 
and were largely auctioned off by the Nazis.	
Generally unremarked in the English-language literature is that Fuchs did not 
happen by chance upon his contacts to the figures of the Frankfurt School, especially 
Horkheimer.  From the initiation of the underlying institutional developments in the early 
1920s that led to the Institute’s foundation until Fuchs’s death in 1940, he was in regular 
contact with Horkheimer.  Likely from its inception, Fuchs belonged to the trustees of the 
Society for Social Research [Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung], the private foundation 
established in 1922 by Felix Weil with a substantial endowment from his wealthy father 
to support the Institute that came to share its name (Gorsen, 2006, p. 220; Weitz, 1991, 
pp. 413-416).  The early group of trustees also included additional Weil family members, 
Friedrich Pollock, Max Horkheimer, Kurt Albert Gerlach, and Richard Sorge (Jay, 1996, 
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pp. 8-9; Wiggershaus, 1995, pp. 20-21).1  It appears that Fuchs and Weil had originally 
met in Tübingen when they overlapped for a short time as students there, and discovered 
their shared interests in revolutionary politics.  Weil’s activities as a student agitator had 
even led to his legal banishment from Württemberg, and his relationship with Fuchs 
remained close enough that he apparently even arranged for Fuchs to serve as trustee of 
some portion of his personal fortune (Weitz, 2014, p. 272).  Fuchs’s association with the 
Institute took the form of his establishment in 1924, again with Weil’s financial 
assistance and after discussions with Horkheimer, of a Berlin-based 
Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv (Archive for Social Research).  The primary goal of the 
Archive was to collect material about the German working class and the political parties 
affiliated with it (Weitz, 2014, p. 273).  For this archive, Fuchs purchased a large amount 
of material from the newly-formed KPD, which at the time was constantly in the sights of 
the German authorities for its advocacy of revolutionary overthrow of the republic.  The 
Archive attracted notice from significant figures in international communism, and 
brought Fuchs into contact with David Riazanov, the director of the Marx-Engels 
Institute in Moscow.  In October 1925, however, barely a year after the Archive had 
begun operations, the Prussian police raided it on the suspicion that it formed an illegal 
archive related to the KPD’s treasonous activities.  Fuchs was soon being personally 
																																																								
1 Neither Jay nor Wiggershaus note that Fuchs was among the original trustees, and this 
is surely a significant source of the lack of awareness about his participation among 
English-speaking scholars.  It is possible that Fuchs joined at a somewhat later date, and 
therefore would not have been listed among the founding trustees.  It is nonetheless clear 
that his involvement was significant.  Fuchs’s somewhat shadowy involvement could 
plausibly have been the source of rumors noted by Jay: “To my knowledge however, 
there is no evidence to indicate any political contributors, although allegations to this 
effect were made by the Institute’s detractors in later years” (Jay, 1996, p. 8).	
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investigated for treason by the state prosecutors, though they concluded in March 1926 
that evidence was insufficient to charge him (Weitz, 2014, pp. 276-284).	
Through his work with the Archive and its materials both before and after its 
official dissolution, Fuchs was regularly in correspondence with the Institute, especially 
with Friedrich Pollock, who held a range of responsibility for the Institute’s 
administrative operations (Wiggershaus, 1995).  He apparently even regularly visited the 
Institute’s photographic laboratory in Frankfurt in order to assist in the making of 
photographic reproductions of significant documents and images of the history of 
Marxism, all the while in regular correspondence with Riazanov (Weitz, 2014, p. 286).  
Nonetheless the relationship with the Institute had moments of significant friction.  In the 
aftermath of the police raid on the Archive, it came to light that, apparently without 
Fuchs’s knowledge, some of the Archive’s employees had been hired at the behest of the 
KPD.  Pollock and the Institute, always concerned that they not become associated with 
potentially illegal political activities, chose to close the archive and end the employment 
of the staff effective 31 December 1925.  As Pollock wrote to Fuchs, the Institute “has 
been drawn, due to the lack of conscience on the part of certain employees, into a 
political affair.” Because the Institute “wanted to avoid, under all circumstances, being 
drawn into the political struggle,” it had no choice but to dissolve the Archive (Weitz, 
2014, p. 282).	
Pollock’s language here prefigures conflicts that the leaders of the Institute, 
especially Horkheimer, would have with other members during the Institute’s period of 
exile in the United States due to concerns that the Institute not cultivate a political 
reputation too close to Marxism or communism (Amidon & Worrell, 2008; Worrell, 
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2006).  It is therefore no exaggeration to describe Fuchs as having held a central position 
in the establishment and financing of the Frankfurt School.  Fuchs even corresponded 
with Horkheimer in the late 1930s about the possibility of emigrating to the United States 
(Weitz, 2014, p. 357).  Horkheimer remained circumspect in his extant correspondence 
and papers about why he wished to have an article about Fuchs written for the ZfS, and 
why he chose Benjamin to write it.  There is also no evidence in the correspondence 
between Benjamin, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Pollock that Fuchs himself felt it necessary 
to reveal to or discuss with Benjamin his longstanding connections with Horkheimer and 
the Institute.  Fuchs, indeed, always remained the vanishing mediator, the “man in the 
shadows.”  Scholarship has revealed, however, that his activities were so closely bound 
up with the Institute that while he cannot count as one if its inner circle, he must be 
recognized as standing among its most closely affiliated figures.	
	
Sexuality, Pornography, and the Realization of the Fuchs Essay	
When Benjamin’s complete draft of the Fuchs essay reached New York, Horkheimer 
proved to be very pleased with it despite its arduous process of composition and much 
concern about the result.  He wrote an extensive letter to Benjamin on 16 March 1937 
with his thoughts and comments about the essay, and introduced it with a statement of 
strong praise: “I congratulate you on it.  I read it with the greatest pleasure.  You have 
solved this task, which for many reasons did not come easily to you, at last in a way that 
the true theoretical intentions of the Zeitschrift are advanced by it” (Benjamin, 1977, p. 
1331; trans. Amidon).  In introducing his suggestions for (mostly minor) revisions, 
Horkheimer went on to emphasize the collaborative nature of the work represented in the 
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ZfS, stating that the authors of all of the major essays in the volume shared ideas with one 
another on their pieces, usually in person.  The institute’s project thus represented a 
multi-layered form of collaboration.  The 1937 issue of the ZfS also represented the 
moment at which Horkheimer’s vision for Critical Theory achieved its methodological 
breakthrough.  It contained, along with the Fuchs essay, Horkheimer’s essay “Traditional 
and Critical Theory,” which brought together in a fully-fledged programmatic statement 
Horkheimer’s long-developing ideas for the Frankfurt School’s method of critical 
interdisciplinary scholarship (Amidon, 2008).  While the ZfS had published Benjamin’s 
work previously, particularly a French translation of a shorter version of “The Work of 
Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility” in the 1936 volume, the 
simultaneous publication of the Fuchs essay and Horkheimer’s methodological manifesto 
demonstrates the centrality of Benjamin’s intellectual work to the project of Critical 
Theory at the moment of its crystallization.  While Benjamin would occasionally express 
to others a desire to maintain some distance between his own work and the Institute’s 
greater project, in the later 1930s his essays became major pillars of the Frankfurt 
School’s emergent scholarly and critical identity (Eiland & Jennings, 2014, p. 388).	
In Horkheimer’s conclusion to his letter of 16 March 1937, however, he takes up, 
after six pages of detailed comments on the content of the essay, a theme that foregrounds 
the core thematic constellation of the essay discussed above: pornography.  Pornography 
brings together in a complex and value-laden genre the constitutive themes of the essay: 
corporeality, sexuality and the reproduction of images.  Horkheimer’s comments contrast 
strongly with Benjamin’s choice (likely made later, and without evidence that 
Horkheimer, Adorno, or others suggested it), to tone down in his critique of Fuchs’s 
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understanding of the destructive power of sexuality and the orgasm.  Horkheimer 
suggests to Benjamin that he address the concern, clearly broached in Fuchs’s trials on 
charges of obscenity, that his volumes were received in the market as pornography:	
I found one small thought lacking, which while less than flattering with respect to 
Fuchs, could be revealing to the matter.  Nowhere, namely, is it indicated, that 
even despite all the Puritanism, the success of Fuchs’s publications in the market 
can be derived not least the fact that they were sought out as pornography.  That 
he himself never reckoned with this, and in fact was not even capable of 
reckoning with this, doesn’t necessarily do him honor, but belongs nonetheless to 
the understanding of his livelihood as a writer.  I leave it to you whether you want 
to add a little sentence or a paragraph in which this subject matter is thought about 
(Benjamin, 1977, p. 1337; trans. Amidon).	
Horkheimer then concluded his letter by explaining that Friedrich Pollock, who 
functioned as the chief administrator of the Institute, would be arriving in Paris on the 
same ship as the letter, and that he would trust Benjamin and Pollock to decide how to 
approach Fuchs with the manuscript of the essay.  Horkheimer was not optimistic, 
expecting that Fuchs would “curse.”	
 Benjamin responded to Horkheimer’s comments extensively in a letter of 28 
March 1937.  Nowhere in this letter, however, did he address Horkheimer’s remarks 
about the perception of Fuchs’s publications as pornography.  As published, the essay 
does contain one mention of pornography.  Nonetheless, there appears to be no other 
mention of Horkheimer’s suggestion anywhere in Benjamin’s later published 
correspondence. Benjamin thus becomes, in a curious way, doubly silent about sexuality 
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and its visual representation as pornography: not just did he eliminate his critical 
comment about Fuchs’s lack of understanding of it, but he appears to have chosen not 
take up Horkheimer’s suggestion that he elaborate on pornography in the essay itself.	
 Benjamin’s silence here is curious not because it evinces a reticence to discuss or 
analyze the relationship between pornography and other forms of text and image.  Rather, 
it is curious precisely because Benjamin clearly did consider pornography to belong to 
the spheres of representation and reproduction that drew his interest in the Fuchs essay.  
In 1927 he wrote and published in the respected journal Die literarische Welt a short 
essay with the title “A State Monopoly on Pornography.”  This essay is a reflection upon 
the banning by the Spanish authorities of a certain class of publications widely available 
in newsstands.  These often included texts by respected authors writing pornographic 
literature, often under their own names.  In it he argues – in a manner striking for its 
combination of seriousness and irony – that language, by its very nature, contains 
elements that tend toward the pornographic.  Benjamin does not consider here directly the 
relationships between language, text, and image that became central to the Fuchs essay, 
but the stakes are similar.  He argues that all language is representational, and holds 
within itself a certain pornographic potential: “In one respect, pornographic books are 
like other books: they are all based on language and writing.  If language did not contain 
elements in its vocabulary that are obscene in themselves, pornography would be robbed 
of its best instruments” (Benjamin, 2000, p. 72).  This claim develops into an early form 
of Benjamin’s argument for a critical-historical method that pays closest attention not to 
the beautiful or privileged, but to fragments, detritus, remainders:	
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Language in the various phases of its historical development is a single great 
experiment that is conducted in as many laboratories as there are people….  By-
products of every kind are inevitable.  They include all the idioms and fixed 
expressions, whether written or spoken, that stand outside normal usage: 
nicknames, company names, swear words, oaths, devotional expressions, and 
obscenities.  These may be excessive, lacking in expression, sacred, a 
fermentation of cultic language, or else overexplicit, shameless, and depraved.  
The waste products of daily usage, these same elements acquire a crucial value in 
other contexts – in scientific contexts, above all – since there these astonishing 
linguistic splinters can be understood as fragments from the primeval granite of 
the linguistic massif (Benjamin, 2000, pp. 72-73).	
Knowledge, for Benjamin, emerges most significantly from objects that, because they are 
perceived only as waste, are commonly overlooked by disciplinary inquiry.  They resist 
easy subsumption into received forms or categories.	
 Benjamin draws two conclusions from this set of observations about the 
inherently pornographic qualities of linguistic representation.  The first is that rather than 
try to banish the obscene from social discourse, society ought to make use of the forces 
out of which it emerges.  Here he prefigures arguments from the Fuchs essay.  Rather 
than suppressing the obscene, he argues that it represents powerful forces that must be 
harnessed.  He deploys a powerful technological metaphor here: “Just as Niagara Falls 
feeds power stations, in the same way the downward torrent of language into smut and 
vulgarity should be used as a mighty source of energy to drive the dynamo of the creative 
act” (Benjamin, 2000, p. 73). The second is a counter-intuitive idea that must at once be 
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provocative and ironic: “For this reason we call for a state monopoly on pornography.  
We demand the socialization of this not inconsiderable source of power” (Benjamin, 
2000, p. 73).  His conclusion is that doing so would put economic forces into the service 
of art, because talented authors could be properly remunerated for their expertise.  This 
fascinating heterodoxy in Benjamin’s thought – a quasi-capitalist argument in the service 
of the goal of the “socialization” of the power of a socially disruptive representational 
form – looks forward to the fully developed critical-historical methods advocated in the 
Fuchs essay.	
	
Historical Materialism, Knowledge, and the Remnants of the Corporeal	
The Fuchs essay takes the stakes of the argument found in “A State Monopoly on 
Pornography” and develops them both in breadth, incorporating the representation and 
reproduction of images as well as texts, and in depth, exploring a controversial but 
shadowy figure who worked across political, cultural, and intellectual boundaries.  The 
result is a complex and variegated discussion of the political economy of art, out of which 
Benjamin develops a sophisticated argument about the critical methods of historical 
materialist scholarship.  His argument brings together the material of history, the 
relationship between text and image, moral psychology, the biological, and the corporeal.	
 Before the Fuchs essay saw print in the 1937 ZfS, however, Benjamin had to 
contend with a concern on the part of the editorial board, likely led by Pollock, that the 
essay was too overtly Marxist, and could therefore endanger the Institute’s scholarly 
status – much in the same way that Pollock had scolded Fuchs a decade before for having 
allowed, even unintentionally, the Institute to be pulled into political controversy through 
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the Archive’s links to the KPD.  This resulted in a third elision in the process of the 
essay’s realization, alongside Benjamin’s removal of his strongest critical statement 
about Fuchs’s deficits and his lack of response to Horkheimer’s advice that he address the 
question of the pornographic marketability of Fuchs’s works.  In the original published 
version of the essay, the editors deleted the entire first paragraph, which included the 
claim that “it is the recent past of the Marxist theory of art which is at issue here….  For 
unlike Marxist economics, this theory still has no history” (260).  Benjamin had little 
choice but to go along with this decision.  The apparent motivation on the part of the 
editors was that Fuchs’s collections, still stuck in Nazi Germany, remained in (ultimately 
unsuccessful) litigation about their release and potential export, and that reminders of 
Fuchs’s Marxist associations could possibly endanger this process further (Benjamin, 
1977).	
Benjamin’s argument in the first section of the Fuchs essay rapidly develops into 
a powerful statement of the critical-historical method that not only observes and analyzes 
the material detritus of modern life, but takes on the hypostasized edifices of disciplinary 
orthodoxy about historical facts and breaks them up.  Just as language tends toward the 
pornographic, materialist historical cognition tends toward the destructive, even violent:	
The historical materialist blasts the epoch out of its reified “historical continuity,” 
and thereby the life out of the epoch, and the work out of the lifework.  Yet this 
construct results in the simultaneous preservation and sublation [Aufhebung] of 
the lifework in the work, of the epoch in the lifework, and of the course of history 
in the epoch (262; emphasis original).	
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For Benjamin here, “life” carries three valences of meaning, and a fourth that remains a 
dialectically charged implication.  It means, firstly, the life of an individual as 
biographical history; secondly, the metaphorical sense of the epoch itself being alive, 
rather than dead; and thirdly, the conceptual sense of life as the object of biological 
inquiry.  The fourth valence is the implied one: if “life” in all these senses forms a locus 
of historical materialist inquiry, then the question of the embodied qualities of that life is 
dialectically implicit.  In all three of these valences of meaning, the corporeality of the 
living being is sublated.  The body’s absence from these arguments recursively generates 
the possibility of its presence.	
 The remarkable conclusion here is that a successfully critical historical 
materialism renders historical facts not as an eternal, “epic” image of the past, but as a 
means of linking past, present, and future.  Thus, Benjamin argues, adding further layers 
to the concept “life”: “Historical materialism conceives historical understanding as an 
afterlife of that which has been understood and whose pulse can be felt in the present” 
(262).  The past, therefore, has two lives.  Benjamin’s motto here could very well be “The 
past is dead.  Long live the past.”  “Afterlife” here stands dialectically stretched between 
the prepositional sense of ‘living past’ a given point in time, of surviving and carrying 
forward, and the nominal sense of a ‘living past,’ that the past lives on without bound 
through its remnants and artifacts.  This ‘living past,’ however, is what the historical 
materialist presents through experience: “Historical materialism presents a given 
experience with the past – an experience that is unique….  The immense forces bound up 
in historicism’s ‘Once upon a time’ are liberated in this experience….  [Historical 
materialism] is directed toward a consciousness of the present which explodes the 
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continuum of history” (262).  The unity implied here between the nominal and 
prepositional qualities of the living past requires in turn the unity of the subject and 
object of historical practice.  The body becomes social by living past itself, resolving into 
the possibility of its own cognition beyond itself in the living past.  Experience, then, is 
the body’s journey into historical materiality, but this materiality is always dialectically 
charged with the body’s vanishing into historicity.	
 Section II of the Fuchs essay focuses on the details of Fuchs’s biography.  In 
Section III, Benjamin further develops his critique of what he sees to be the uncritical 
aspects of cultural history [Kulturgeschichte] out of significant thematic elements that he 
has raised in his treatment Fuchs’s “life.”  Here is found the aphoristic phrase that has 
emerged from the essay as its most memorable, that “There is no document of culture 
which is not at the same time a document of barbarism” (267).  The context of this 
statement, however, is crucial to its interpretation.  Benjamin embeds it within the 
elaboration of his thematics of life in multiple ways.  First, he links history to life through 
the concept “lineage,” emphasizing the generational flow of the material that becomes 
history.  Here he emphasizes in particular the ways that traditional disciplinarity renders 
that material static, even dead, and thereby sunders it from historical cognition.  This 
deadening process further leaves this material indistinguishable from property, and 
thereby from the processes of alienation that underlie capital accumulation	
Doesn’t the study of individual disciplines (once the semblance of their unity has 
been removed) inevitably coalesce in the study of cultural history as the inventory 
which humanity has preserved to the present day? […] Whatever the historical 
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materialist surveys in art or science has, without exception, a lineage he cannot 
observe without horror (267).	
Then, after the famous phrase about the mutual implication of culture and barbarism, 
Benjamin redoubles the focus on property and ownership, drawing in his themes of 
human reproduction and destruction.  He initiates the passage with a rhetorical flourish 
that shows the stakes, and demonstrates that claims about barbarism are only a subsidiary 
point.  The passage culminates in a statement that makes clear the distinction between the 
“survival” of the dead artifacts of cultural history and the living past – afterlife – of the 
objects of dialectical materialist history.	
Nevertheless the crucial element does not lie here.  If the concept of culture is 
problematic for historical materialism, it cannot conceive of the disintegration of 
culture into goods which become objects of possession for mankind….  The 
concept of culture – as the embodiment of creations considered independent, if 
not of the production process in which they originate, then of a production process 
in which they continue to survive – has a fetishistic quality.  Culture appears 
reified (267).	
This sense of reification captures the process whereby concepts, ideas, and 
representations – the intangible material that recursively renders into the texts and images 
of the objects of culture – become property.  It is how these objects are separated from 
the dialectically charged space of experience out of which they emerge and which further 
allows their capture as forms of capital.  Here lies the core of Benjamin’s critique of 
Fuchs: as a materialist and as a historian, he was unable to see deeply enough into these 
dynamics.  Fuchs’s studies and collecting practices made materialist historical analysis 
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possible.  Fuchs himself, however, never achieved a fully-fledged form of historical 
practice adequate to his material.	
The passage that leads into this statement by completing Benjamin’s discussion of 
Fuchs’s biography in section II brings together all of the essay’s thematic constituents: 
the body, sexuality, production, destruction, excess, experience text, even war.  This 
thematic complex then requires a symbolic figuration adequate to the density of the 
material packed into the argument.  That figure, expanded and refigured into the concept 
traffic [Verkehr] in the passage, is perhaps the nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
technology that captured the greatest symbolic power, because it became the visible 
figure of the institutional expansion of capital accumulation through public and private 
finance: the locomotive.  Benjamin quotes here both French and German figures who saw 
the locomotive as “the saint of the future” and as a kind of refigured “angel…since a 
locomotive is worth more than the nicest pair of wings” (266).  Benjamin was 
furthermore one of the earliest literary critics to recognize the significance of an author 
whose work explores in great symbolic and figurative depth the nature of Verkehr: Franz 
Kafka (Anderson, 1992).  Further, this passage points subtly to the primary means by 
which the body is sublated into and through capital: through the alienation of labor.  The 
embodied qualities of industrial labor – everywhere manifest in the physical operation of 
the shrieking, panting, smoking, roaring steam locomotive with its engineer and fireman 
visible in the cab and illuminated often by the light of the firebox flames – vanish in the 
experience of the bourgeoisie.  Benjamin’s words give this dialectics of corporeality, and 
its links to historical materialist practice, vivid texture:	
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It may cause one to ask whether the complacency [Gemütlichkeit] of the 
nineteenth-century bourgeoisie did not stem from the hollow comfort of never 
having to experience how the productive forces had to develop under their hands.  
This experience was really reserved for the following century, which has 
discovered that the speed of traffic [Verkehr] and the ability of machines to 
duplicate words and writing outstrips human needs.  The energies that technology 
develops beyond this threshold are destructive.  First of all, they advance the 
technology of war and its propagandistic preparation (267).	
Here “traffic” – Verkehr – must be understood to carry its double load of symbolic 
meaning emerging from the German concept: Verkehr is both traffic in the technological-
economic sense, and sexual relations not as an abstract concept, but as the potential 
physical interaction between bodies.  The economy’s surplus, which becomes its 
potential for destruction, thus reveals its close correlation with the potentially excessive 
moments in sexuality.  Destruction thereby begins to reveal its dialectical variegation.  
Within the entire Fuchs essay, this passage brings out most directly the negative loadings 
of destruction in Benjamin’s thought.  Nonetheless it reveals where, using Benjamin’s 
own term, the threshold lies between destruction as violence, exploitation, and alienation 
and destruction as a constitutive process in the making-manifest of the material of a 
living, productive, dialectical form of history.	
	
Prurience, Prudery, and Production: Sexuality and its Representation under the 
Condition of Technological Reproducibility	
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At this point in the essay, the stakes of the statement about the destructive quality of the 
orgasm that Benjamin excised from the essay have been revealed.  He is ready to describe 
in detail the content of Fuchs’s work, and how it relates to the methods and tasks of 
historical materialism. Benjamin targets his criticisms of Fuchs at several different levels 
of argument.  Foremost among them is Benjamin’s exploration of how and why Fuchs’s 
work could at once be seen by the German authorities as prurient to the point of 
pornographically obscene, but at the same time, Fuchs’s own arguments recapitulated 
forms of bourgeois moralism to the point of prudery.  This discussion extends over 
sections IV and V of the essay, which further extend the exploration of the themes of 
dialectical materialist epistemology, creativity and biological life.	
 Benjamin begins with a short discussion of Fuchs’s career that brings out the 
tensions and struggles that Fuchs faced: “Those aspects of his work which are likely to 
endure were wrested from an intellectual constellation that could hardly have appeared 
less propitious.  This is the point where Fuchs the collector taught Fuchs the theoretician 
to comprehend much that the times denied him” (268).  Immediately here, for the first 
and only time in the main body of the essay, Benjamin raises the question of pornography 
in relation to Fuchs’s work, framing it with a statement about the destruction of 
traditional disciplinary discourses: “He was a collector who strayed into marginal areas – 
such as caricature and pornographic imagery – which sooner or later meant the ruin of a 
whole series of clichés in traditional art history” (268).  Fuchs himself, in Benjamin’s 
interpretation, specifically set himself apart from classicistic concepts of art, but in doing 
so, the qualities of moralistic prudery that his work contains became manifest through a 
kind of sublimation of the corporeal aspects of artistic representation.  Benjamin frames 
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this in an embedded quotation from the first volume of Fuchs’s Erotic Art: “Fuchs 
prophesied a new beauty ‘which, in the end, will be infinitely greater than that of 
antiquity.  Whereas the latter was only the highest animalistic form, the new beauty will 
be filled with a lofty spiritual and emotional content’” (269).  It is not the stock Marxist 
rhetoric of “form” and “content” which interests Benjamin here, however, but rather the 
opportunity to highlight how Fuchs’s weaknesses contribute to the advancement of 
historical materialist understanding.  He continues with another of the essay’s well-
known passages that vividly represents practices of the reception of art as themselves the 
fragmentary artifacts of cognition that must be sublated into a fuller form of knowledge:	
Of course it would be a mistake to assume that the idealist view of art was itself 
entirely unhinged.  That cannot happen until the disjecta membra which idealism 
contains – as “historical representation” on the one hand and “appreciation” on 
the other – are merged and therefore surpassed (269).	
This argument does not denigrate Fuchs’s conceptual vocabulary or interpretive 
practices, or of other theorists of art like Heinrich Wölfflin, whose formalism is 
compared in this section to Fuchs’s practices.  Slightly later, Benjamin also dramatically 
compares Fuchs to the ethnologist Adolf Bastian, whose “insatiable hunger for material” 
(271) led him to embark on research and collecting expeditions with the same tireless, 
nearly compulsive enthusiasm that Fuchs showed toward his collecting, writing, 
publishing, and political work.	
 This discussion of the ways in which forms of interpretive or disciplinary practice 
themselves must be understood as the material of historical understanding – an argument 
that parallels closely Horkheimer’s claims differentiating Critical Theory from traditional 
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theory – leads Benjamin toward his first longer discussion of technologies of 
reproduction in the Fuchs essay.  This anticipates not only later passages but also 
develops parallels with the Artwork essay, composed in the midst of the long process of 
work on the Fuchs essay.  Here it becomes clear that rhetoric of destruction is directed 
specifically not toward material objects – and most definitely not toward bodies – but 
toward abstract disciplines and techniques of representation and interpretation that can 
become captured within processes of technological reproduction.  He develops this 
argument from the outset by distinguishing “the historical object” itself from such 
disciplinary practices: “The historical object removed from pure facticity does not need 
any ‘appreciation.’”  Furthermore, Fuchs was a pioneer because, as Benjamin argues, his 
work centers around “motifs” that “refer to forms of knowledge which could only prove 
destructive to traditional forms of art” (269).  	
Fuchs’s failure – the reason that his interpretations have little “destructive force” 
(270), is because Fuchs did not make this connection between artistic objects, practices of 
interpretation and representation, and technologies of reproduction.  He could therefore 
default only to largely vacuous interpretive concepts like “mood of the times,” which 
despite his materialist intentions left his thinking undialectical and therefore inadequate 
to the fullness of history.  Benjamin, however, takes this opportunity to make some of his 
most forceful statements in the essay about the centrality of reproductive technologies to 
historical understanding.  The central point here is how a clearly historical materialist 
approach can counter the process whereby art and its processes of production, 
interpretation, and reception can be captured by capital.	
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The concern with techniques of reproduction, more than any other line of 
research, brings out the crucial importance of reception; it enables us to correct 
the process of reification which takes place in a work of art….  For it is precisely 
historical materialism that is interested in tracing the changes of artistic vision not 
so much to a changed ideal of beauty [a core argument in Fuchs’s texts], as to 
more elementary processes – processes set in motion by economic and 
technological transformations in production. (269-270).	
Attention to the history and political economy of the many layers of reproduction begins, 
therefore, to emerge as the most effective epistemology.  The dynamics of capitalism tear 
the work of art from its technical and social field of relation.  Historical materialism seeks 
to restore this embeddedness.	
 Sections V, VI, VII, and VIII discuss both intensively and extensively Fuchs’s 
ideas about artistic creativity.  Benjamin thus returns through two different angles to the 
issue of the body: through Fuchs’s arguments about the embodied qualities of creativity 
that link it to sexuality, and again through Fuchs’s tendency to recapitulate forms of 
bourgeois moralism in his texts.  This two-pronged approach generates the most 
revealing contrasts and tensions between Benjamin’s methods and Fuchs’s.  It thus makes 
manifest the reasons why Benjamin struggled with his work on the Fuchs essay: they 
both make arguments about the relationships between the body, art, and the social, and 
teasing their positions apart is a not a straightforward task.	
 Section V contains the most revealing material in the essay on life and the forms 
of inquiry into it.  Here, as introduced above, Benjamin engages with the disciplinary 
field of biology in his exploration of the flaws in Fuchs’s historical approach.  He states 
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that “Fuchs’s notion of creativity has a strongly biological slant” (272).  The meaning of 
“biological” here only becomes clear in the subsequent discussion, as Benjamin explains 
how that this refers to how Fuchs saw creativity as a manifestation of sexuality.  Without 
using the Freudian language of sublimation (as significantly as is what Benjamin notes to 
be Fuchs’s closeness to psychoanalytic concepts), Fuchs saw artistic objects as 
manifestations of erotic energy.  Biology therefore becomes, in Benjamin’s analytical 
schema, coterminous with a concept of sexuality as something going well beyond the 
sphere of the corporeal.  While this hardly does justice to the complex politics of the 
biological disciplines in the early twentieth-century German-speaking world, Benjamin 
develops the claim into a subtle linking of Fuchs’s Social Democratic commitments in 
the 1890s to his own arguments about historical materialism – and this link itself reveals 
significant moments of those biological politics.  As Benjamin explains, the German 
Social Democratic Party’s commitment to Darwin alongside Marx as a foundational 
narrative of historical progress meant that “history assumed deterministic traits” (273).  
What the SPD did with its program of political education, therefore, was to produce a 
kind of pseudo-dialectics.  Where the emergent narratives of large-scale change in 
dynamic societies or organismal populations that parallel each other in Marx and Darwin 
contained highly variegated dialectical tools of analysis, the party’s making of them into 
reified forms of political enlightenment evacuated them of their power for historical 
materialism.	
Benjamin goes on to show further – in another exploration of the subtleties of the 
epistemic field of biology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – the 
functioning of a number of sub-disciplinary emanations of nineteenth century biology in 
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the political discourse of the time.  Here he appropriates terms from the critic H. 
Laufenberg that link biological and political-economic categories: “Nevertheless, many 
were satisfied with the theses which divided historical processes into ‘physiological’ and 
‘pathological’ ones, or affirmed that the materialism of natural science ‘automatically 
turned into historical materialism once it came into the hands of the proletariat’” (273).  
Clearly, such naïve political narratives could not carry the power that their original 
advocates had hoped they would.  Benjamin rounds off the section with the conclusion 
that no matter how much narratives of progress might seem to embody the living past of 
historical materialism, they usually fail, because they traffic in the evacuation of the 
dialectical aspects of thought.	
 Section VII focuses specifically on the question of Fuchs’s bourgeois moralism, 
and how it relates to the reductive historical thinking that led Fuchs to give credence to 
undialectical progress narratives.  Again, of course, Fuchs’s collecting and scholarship 
carry the potential to provide the basis for a genuinely materialist history.  But 
undifferentiated forms of the reception of Marxist thought and theory thwarted this 
possibility.  Revolution was no simple narrative of progressive triumph in sequential 
class conflicts:	
Not surprisingly the bourgeois moralism contains elements which collide with 
Fuchs’s materialism.  If Fuchs had recognized this, he might have been able to 
tone down this opposition.  He was convinced, however, that that his moralistic 
consideration of history and his historical materialism were in complete accord.  
This was an illusion, buttressed by a widespread opinion badly in need of 
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revision: that the bourgeois revolutions, as celebrated by the bourgeoisie itself, are 
the immediate source of a proletarian revolution (277).	
In Benjamin’s reading, bourgeois moralism arose out of this self-congratulatory 
sensibility, culminating in a “class morality” of “conscience” that served to embed the 
injustice of property relations built on the basis of alienated labor even deeper into 
economic relations.	
 The themes of sexuality, moralism, and creativity are read together in section 
VIII, which serves as the first of two full elaborations of Benjamin’s thematic 
constellation.  He begins by quoting a statement by Fuchs that clearly shows the tensions 
in his moralistic rhetoric about sexuality.  Here Fuchs deploys the language of the 
“Lebensphilosophie” of nineteenth-century Germany, and furthermore, in an evacuated 
form, the vocabulary of “values” that dominated late German neo-Kantian philosophy 
around 1900, implying obliquely that sexuality drives reproduction, both artistic and 
biological.  Where Fuchs finds sexuality and creativity demonstrably linked, he values 
them together.  Where he sees sexuality essentially only as embodied practice of 
pleasure, his moralistic revulsion drives him so far as to dub it “evil.”  Here Benjamin 
again quotes from the early parts of the first volume of Fuchs’s Erotische Kunst:	
Concerning sexuality he says: ‘All forms of sensual behavior in which the 
creative element of their law of life becomes visible are justified. Certain forms, 
however, are evil – namely those in which this highest of drives becomes 
degraded to a mere means of refined craving for pleasure…’  Fuchs never 
acquired a proper distrust of the bourgeois scorn for pure sexual pleasure and the 
more or less fantastic means of creating it (278-279).	
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In a subtle but clear reference to the medicalizing discourses in later nineteenth-century 
European juridico-legal approaches to forms of non-procreative sexuality, Benjamin 
further notes how Fuchs, in a parallel manner, accepts and deploys arguments about 
practices seen as being “against nature” and representing “degenerate individuality” 
(279).  Benjamin thereby closes additional links in his thematic constellation between the 
body, sexuality, reproduction, and historical knowledge.	
 Fuchs revels in his material undialectically, failing to recognize the moments of 
excess in commodity reproduction that destructively enable the accumulation of capital.  
He thereby accretes and recapitulates bourgeois moral forms including the exclusion and 
disavowal of non-reproductive sexuality, all via speculative detours into reductive 
biologistic and natural-historical argument.  Benjamin insists, rather, that the destructive 
excess itself becomes the engine of historical cognition.  He thereby opens up a space for 
the emergence of social ontology.  Fuchs looks on the surface like a libertine, and the 
German authorities repeatedly took him for a potentially criminal one.  Nonetheless he 
was not.   His short-circuited recapitulation of bourgeois modes of production and 
reproduction drive him to accept and deploy bourgeois sex morality.  He was no libertine.	
 Benjamin appears here to be defending a kind of pleasure principle-driven 
practice and understanding of sexuality, but one that remains always in the service of 
historical materialist cognition.  Fuchs liberates the gaze in the service of freeing the 
proletariat, and focuses it on the body and its accretions (fashion, caricature, political 
symbol).  His underdeveloped theory of history, however, leaves the body subject to the 
coercive and alienating strictures of bourgeois disciplinarity, just as his techno-
reproductive method itself resolved his collections into substantial financial and real 
	31	
property.  Benjamin liberates the fragments, remnants, artifacts, and detritus of the body 
in order to place them in the service of a fully dialectical materialist method that holds 
promise to give form to social processes.  He does so, however, at the expense of 
requiring a sublation of the body.  His method renders and dissolves corporeality into 
historical cognition.	
 Here, where Benjamin brings his analysis of Fuchs to its most pointedly powerful 
critical conclusions, this tension between their respective forms of argument erupts in a 
telling contrast. This is in the passage where Benjamin specifically explores Fuchs’s 
engagement with the “sexual-psychological problem.”  At the same time that he praises 
some of Fuchs’s analytical claims, he criticizes Fuchs for a “detour through natural 
history.”  He himself, however, deploys an analogous kind of argument in a footnote to 
this passage, almost as if he wished to demonstrate how his fully developed critical 
historical methods could do justice to the material of the past in ways that Fuchs’s cannot.	
 In introducing this argument, Benjamin emphasizes that “it is difficult to clarify 
the sexual-psychological problem” (279).  He continues, however, with a specifically 
historical-materialist discussion that links bourgeois economic and moral practices, and 
culminates in simultaneous criticism and praise of Fuchs:	
But ever since the bourgeoisie came to power, this clarification has become 
particularly important.  This is where taboos against more or less broad areas of 
sexual pleasure have their place.  The repressions which are thereby produced in 
the masses engender masochistic and sadistic complexes.  Those in power then 
further these complexes by delivering up to the masses those objects which prove 
most favorable to their own politics….  Fuchs failed to produce a social critique 
	32	
in this regard.  Thus, a passage where he compensates for this lack by by means of 
a detour through natural history becomes all the more important.  The passage in 
question is his brilliant defense of orgies [found in vol. 2 of Erotische Kunst] 
(279).	
Benjamin elaborates on how Fuchs, in this and similar passages, “deals critically with 
traditional norms” (279).  Remarkably, however, and in a way reminiscent of the 
dialectical irony of his claims about state control of pornography, Benjamin includes a 
footnote here that itself hypothesizes a straightforwardly natural-historical explanation 
for human sexual practices, one that centers around precisely the thing that Benjamin 
thought Fuchs failed to understand: the orgasm:	
Fuchs is on the track of something important here.  Would it be too rash to 
connect the threshold between human and animal, such as Fuchs recognizes in the 
orgy, with that other threshold constituted by the emergence of upright posture?  
The latter brings with it a phenomenon unprecedented in natural history: partners 
can look into each other’s eyes during orgasm.  Only then does an orgy become 
possible.  What is decisive is not the increase in visual stimuli but rather the fact 
that now the expression of satiety and even of impotence can itself become an 
erotic stimulant (299n70).	
Benjamin thus demonstrates that it is not biological explanation itself that he resists in 
Fuchs.  Rather, it is inadequate methods that sunder the links between the past and the 
present, and make it impossible to link embodied practices to social reality.	
 With this point, Benjamin has rounded out the critical and methodological 
framing of the essay.  He has not, however, yet fully shown how his own methods can do 
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greater justice to the material of history than can Fuchs’s.  This he does in the final two 
sections of the essay, which explore the cultural figure who most engaged Fuchs as a 
collector and author: the French artist and caricaturist Honoré Daumier.  Benjamin allows 
his scholarly imagination full flight here, in an imagined rhetorical question linking 
Fuchs’s interpretive work, the language of Darwinistic historical argument including its 
category “life,” the production and reproduction of images, and class analysis, and the 
passage culminates in a claim about the representation of the body:	
What impressed Fuchs most was the element of strife – the agonistic dimension – 
in Daumier’s art.  Would it be too daring to seek the origin of Daumier’s great 
caricatures in a question?  Daumier seems to ask himself: “What would bourgeois 
people of my time look like if one were to imagine their struggle for existence as 
taking place in a palaestra, an arena?”  Daumier translated the public and private 
life of Parisians into the language of the agon.  The athletic tension of the whole 
body – its muscular movements – arouse Daumier’s greatest enthusiasm (281).	
Here, the thematic constituents of Benjamin’s entire analysis begin to come together in a 
thorough critical analysis of an artist who made full use of the reproductive technologies 
of his day.  Fuchs recognized the significance of technological reproduction in 
understanding Daumier and his world, but his methods could not fully carry out the 
consequences of this recognition (283).	
 With this discussion, Benjamin completes his constellation of Fuchs’s 
representational world.  He can therefore grant Fuchs substantial recognition: Fuchs 
sought to restore a properly social understanding of art.	
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Fuchs belongs in this line of great and systematic collectors who were resolutely 
intent on a single subject matter.  It has been his goal to restore to the work of art 
its existence within society, from which it had been so decisively cut off that the 
collector could find it only in the art market; there – reduced to a commodity, far 
removed both from its creators and from those who were able to understand it – 
the work of art endured….  Fuchs was one of the first to expound the specific 
character of mass art and this to develop the impulses he had received from 
historical materialism (283).	
Thoroughly and successfully understood historical materialism is, therefore, the means to 
the end not just of countering the dynamics in capitalism that reduces objects to 
commodities, but also of creating a new form of social ontology that itself successfully 
resists its own evacuation through the processes of capital accumulation.  Only such a 
form of knowledge production can do justice to the embodied practices of the production 
of art, to the sexual lives of individuals in their social surroundings, to the detritus thrown 
off by capital and its processes, and to the understanding of all of the valences of 
reproduction that affect and constitute bodies, works of art, and social worlds. 	
	
Conclusion: Historical Material, Social Ontology, and Critical Practice Today	
Benjamin thus returns, after a thorough exploration of its consequences, to the point he 
drew at the beginning of the Fuchs essay out of an analysis Engels’s discussion, in a letter 
to Franz Mehring written in 1893, of the fate of thought under the regime of capital.  He 
quotes Engels:	
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Ever since the bourgeois illusion of the eternity and finality of capitalist 
production entered the picture, even the overcoming of the mercantilists by the 
physiocrats and Adam Smith is seen as a mere victory of thought – not as the 
reflection in thought of the changed economic facts, but as the finally achieved 
correct insight into actual relations existing always and everywhere (261).	
The idea that capital dominates the world eternally leads not just to the commodification 
of bodies and ideas, but also to the evacuation of genuine political-economic 
understanding.  This is a constitutive moment of the trauma in Eric Santner’s concept of 
the “traumamtlich”: the residual destructiveness present in the institutions and “offices” 
of the modern economy (Santner, 2015).  Economic facts are emptied of social content by 
the false totality of capital.  Capital thereby interrupts social ontology because ideas 
become disconnected from historical-political practice.  Theory also, thereby, runs the 
risk of becoming uncritical: it becomes disciplinarily dominating, excluding from its 
closed sphere of explanatory technique the material from which new knowledge might 
emerge.  Materialist historical practice resolves the possibility of the social out of the 
false equivalences of commodity production and reproduction.  Meaningful critical 
historical practice thus becomes one with social ontology.  Benjamin’s materialist history 
also becomes further congruent with Horkheimer’s Critical Theory, but with an even 
more subtly explored disciplinary and methodological dynamics: true disciplinarity 
resolves history as dialectical image in the present, and thus grounds the emergence of 
potential futures.  All disciplinarity, if it is to be the source of genuine knowledge, must 
therefore recognize its essentially violent destructiveness to be capable of this emergent 
futurity.  Method and material must become emergent in one another.	
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In pursuing this form of methodological-disciplinary renewal, Benjamin dissolves 
the problem of the representation of the body and of sexuality into his constellation of a 
materialist history.  The body of - and in - history is thus resolved into the materialist 
historical process that is revealed through the detritus, artifacts, and disjecta membra of 
social relations.  Materialist history is, therefore, social ontology, but it requires a 
simultaneous understanding of the stakes of the sublation of discrete bodies and sexual 
relations into the constellation of text and image to become so.  This is a lesson that 
today's critical theory needs to make its own.	
 Today’s undialectical discourses of “disruptive innovation” – seeking the 
destruction and fragmentation of existing modes of production in the name of new ones 
that seem, primarily, to concentrate capital accumulation only ever more thoroughly in 
the hands of the partisans of an apolitical or post-political technology – redouble the 
stakes that Benjamin identified in the nineteenth century’s “bungled reception of 
technology” (266): that they heighten and thicken the reification of reproductive forces in 
the service of capital.  A thoroughly revived materialist practice of the sort that Benjamin 
imagined, one that contains within itself the constitutive elements of social ontology, 
might however still hold the promise of attending to the genuine detritus of the 
contemporary techno-economy, perhaps even including the status of labor as a cast-off 
artifact of the cycles of capital accumulation through technological recursion.  This 




Amidon, K. S. (2008). “Diesmal fehlt die Biologie!” Max Horkheimer, Richard 
Thurnwald, and the biological prehistory of German Sozialforschung. New 
German Critique, 35(2), 103-137. 	
Amidon, K. S., & Worrell, M. P. (2008). ARL Gurland, the Frankfurt School, and the 
critical theory of antisemitism. telos, 2008(144), 129-147. 	
Anderson, M. M. (1992). Kafka's clothes: ornament and aestheticism in the Habsburg fin 
de siecle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.	
Bach, U. E. (2010). "It would be delicious to write books for a new society, but not for 
the newly rich": Eduard Fuchs between elite and mass culture. In L. Tatlock (Ed.), 
Publishing culture and the “reading nation”: German book history in the long 
nineteenth century (pp. 294-312). Rochester, NY: Camden House.	
Benjamin, W. (1977). Gesammelte Schriften (Vol. II.3). Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.	
Benjamin, W. (2000). Walter Benjamin: Selected writings, Vol. 2, 1927-1935. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.	
Benjamin, W. (2002). Walter Benjamin: Selected writings, Vol. 3, 1935-1938. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.	
Caygill, H. (1998). Walter Benjamin: The colour of experience. London: Routledge.	
Eiland, H., & Jennings, M. W. (2014). Walter Benjamin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.	
Gliboff, S. (2008). HG Bronn, Ernst Haeckel, and the origins of German darwinism. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.	
Gorsen, P. (2006). Wer war Eduard Fuchs? Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung, 19(3), 215-
233. 	
Jay, M. (1996). The dialectical imagination: A history of the Frankfurt School and the 
Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950. Berkeley: Univ of California Press.	
Jennings, M. W. (1987). Dialectical images: Walter Benjamin's theory of literary 
criticism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ Press.	
Kelly, A. (1981). The descent of Darwin: The popularization of Darwinism in Germany, 
1860-1914. Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press.	
Richter, G. (2002). Walter Benjamin and the corpus of autobiography. Detroit, MI: 
Wayne State University Press.	
38	
Santner, E. L. (2015). The weight of all flesh: On the subject-matter of political economy. 
K. Goodman (Ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.	
Weitz, U. (1991). Salonkultur und Proletariat. Stuttgart: Stöffler und Schütz.	
Weitz, U. (2014). Der Mann im Schatten: Eduard Fuchs. Berlin: Dietz.	
Wiggershaus, R. (1995). The Frankfurt School: Its history, theories, and political 
significance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.	
Worrell, M. P. (2006). The other Frankfurt School. Fast Capitalism, 2(1), 48-72. 
The Social Ontology of Capitalism Krier, Daniel and Worrell, Mark P. (eds.) 
(2016), Palgrave Macmillan US reproduced with permission of Palgrave 
Macmillan'. 'This extract is taken from the author's original manuscript and has 
not been edited. The definitive, published, version of record is available here: 
http://www.palgrave.com/br/book/9781349950614
